Showing posts with label NGO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NGO. Show all posts
Thursday, December 22, 2011
Test Questions I Have Used: The price of everything
In the final for my introductory microeconomics students, I posed a question based on a post on Wronging Rights. It involved an NGO buying up AK-47s in Africa to scrap and sell as jewelry in the West as a means of "doing something" about conflict. The question was to identify why this was a terrible idea, thinking about the incentives increased demand has on the supply side. WR subsequently put up a correction based on an email to the NGO. They do not go around buying guns from dealers, but they buy guns that have been confiscated by the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the UN. If anything, this encourages the government to confiscate more guns, which should do good things for reducing demand and supply.
On a midterm for the same class, I also posed a question based on the growing gender imbalance in some Indian states. Having 8 women to 10 men ought to increase the "price" of a bride that husbands pay, or in this case reduce the price the family of the bride has to pay the groom's family. This article from the World Bank discusses one campaign to encourage single men to get indoor plumbing and a toilet: No loo, no I do. And what do we find? Single men are becoming much more likely to have a toilet for prospective brides in states that have a low female-to-male ratio.
In class we also debated the ethics of kidney donations just in time for a slough of posts to go up around the blogsosphere about them.
Labels:
Conflict,
DRC,
Economics,
Ethics,
food,
Food Prices,
Gender,
Governance,
India,
Markets,
NGO,
Population,
Race
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
The most amazing people in aid
- The guy who changed his domestic ways to become a loving, caring husband after having been exposed once at a road-crossing to a billboard that said: "Stop GBV Now! (HRI with support from Country South of Canada)";
- The Donor representative who, every month, reads every one of the 76 reports they receive from relevant HRI affiliates and therefore has a very clear idea of what each affiliate is doing and where they need most support;
- The inhabitant of the village in "Africa" whose life has changed to the better once she received a slightly used pair of shoes from a mythical place South of Canada;
- The government employee who has successfully made the transition from a cynical, underpaid, mis-qualified relative-of-someone-important to a dynamic, modern element of change in the government, after having interacted with a HRI "Technical Advisor" during a capacity building workshop;
- The guy who returned part of his per-diem after a trip to Nairobi, claiming that the three meals and tea offered during the training were quite sufficient for his subsistence;
More celebrated individuals at Hand Relief.
Less sardonically, Aid Watch had a more serious paper praising and shaming various bilateral aid organizations. Water Wellness also celebrates a community where the impossible dream of proper water project maintenance is happening.
Less sardonically, Aid Watch had a more serious paper praising and shaming various bilateral aid organizations. Water Wellness also celebrates a community where the impossible dream of proper water project maintenance is happening.
Monday, April 11, 2011
Comparative Institutions
What is development and capitalist happiness, USSR edition:
When the Soviet authorities during the 1940s exhibited the 1940 movie The Grapes of Wrath as evidence of how miserable the poor were in capitalist America, it backfired. What amazed the Soviet audiences was that the Joad family fled starvation by car.
A literature review on connections between agriculture, development, and health. Audibert concludes that the link from agriculture to economic growth is well established, but when agricultural projects are carried out they are not always managed appropriately to prevent the spread of diseases. Improving agricultural methods (e.g. integrated pest management) and investing in public goods (health and education) would significantly improve health and development outcomes. It includes a useful and detailed summary table at the end with numerous papers on the subject. Audibert, Martine (2011) “Endemic diseases and agricultural productivity: Challenges and policy response,” presented to AERC Biannual Research Workshop.
The World Bank is contemplating turning into a foundation to fund NGOs. I have several reactions. 1) I really don’t think this is the Bank’s comparative advantage. 2) They haven’t had the best track record in picking winning countries. How are they going to pick winning NGOs? 3) If it amounts largely to a greater willingness to work with NGOs, increase funding possibilities, and have an access route to work around governments, there might be some progress … but there’s going to be a lot of devil in those details.
On institutional innovation and experimentation:
I for one was very surprised that the UN Security Council endorsed military action against Libya. This is big. I suspect the UNSC’s failure to act in Rwanda and the Congo, and to some extent Iraq, played a big role in their decision. That is institutional evolution in action. That makes me hopeful, because I think unified responses and moral authority matter. … On the other hand, if the world threatens and then backs down, or rewards the most thuggish leaders with coalition governments, we could move in the opposite direction.
The tricky thing: however they turn out, we’ll learn very little from the cases of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. The effects and institutions will emerge over decades rather than years. So not only do we have low accountability, we have bad feedback.
Labels:
Africa,
Agriculture,
Bretton,
Conflict,
Development,
Governance,
Growth,
Health,
History,
Lit,
Middle East,
NGO
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
Another big bag of development
Haddad argues that agricultural development could help spur and push Ethiopia's high growth rates into the future, but only if done right. He recommends growth-diagnostic-like tools to identify where the bottlenecks are by agroecological zone. Different reports come to different conclusions about the extent to which government money is spent for political purposes rather than development. Government officials appeared to be knowledgeable about the problems of fast growth and to be asking good questions.
Aid Thoughts is concerned about DfiD's new plan to democratize aid by letting people vote on where the money goes. He argues that "This kind of approach will just increase the skew of development financing away from the economy and towards social development, and reduce the use of General Budget Support, the option that most respects the idea of country ownership of the development process. Still, it’s a consultation, so whether you agree with me or not, let them know."
Tales from the Hood ends its series pondering what we've learned about development in Haiti this year by proposing what it has taught about the kind of transparency initiatives that need to happen: "We’ve let our ordinary citizen supporters believe that we can and will solve any problem – from rubble-removal to general world poverty. But one year later, it is painfully obvious in Haiti at least that we can’t. And they’re mad." Being more honest about the difficulty of aid has long been one of their regular themes.
Lots more below the fold.
Aid Thoughts is concerned about DfiD's new plan to democratize aid by letting people vote on where the money goes. He argues that "This kind of approach will just increase the skew of development financing away from the economy and towards social development, and reduce the use of General Budget Support, the option that most respects the idea of country ownership of the development process. Still, it’s a consultation, so whether you agree with me or not, let them know."
Tales from the Hood ends its series pondering what we've learned about development in Haiti this year by proposing what it has taught about the kind of transparency initiatives that need to happen: "We’ve let our ordinary citizen supporters believe that we can and will solve any problem – from rubble-removal to general world poverty. But one year later, it is painfully obvious in Haiti at least that we can’t. And they’re mad." Being more honest about the difficulty of aid has long been one of their regular themes.
Lots more below the fold.
Labels:
Africa,
Aid,
Development,
Ethiopia,
Governance,
Growth,
NGO,
Religion,
South America,
US
Friday, August 27, 2010
Not a blank slate
Water Wellness confesses the end of a illusion:
I realized the flaw in my assumptions: the environment I entered was not a blank slate.
When thinking of development in rural Africa, I can see how it would be easy to make this assumption. Most images of the Sub-Saharan portray dry, desolate landscapes that conjure feelings of remoteness and destitution. Yet even rural Malawi is awash with NGOs, private sector activities, religious groups, community organizations, and government programs to name just a few. Despite their proximity, effective coordination is a rare occurrence. Most organizations seem to make the same assumption: that their program is filling some kind of void and takes precedence. ... Rural Malawi is anything but a blank slate.
Labels:
Africa,
Aid,
Development,
Malawi,
NGO
Friday, July 30, 2010
The NGO Economy
I thought I was done with the blog for the week until I read this at The .Plan:
I asked Sammy about his greatest challenge in his new SMS content platform business. His two word answer? The "NGO economy."
Sammy noted what should have been intuitive to me after so many trips to Africa, that Africans are naturally entrepreneurial -- many have been making something from nothing all their lives, just to stay alive. But what Sammy said next rocked my world.
"Africans don't see a reward system in place for being entrepreneurial. In fact, they view it as a matter of survival, not an opportunity to lift themselves out of poverty. Rather, what they learn at a very early age, is that in order to make good money, they should learn to speak English incredibly well and then maybe, just maybe, they can get a job driving for an NGO. In a few years, if they play their cards right, they might be able to land an NGO job as a project manager and even advance further."
Sammy's point was simply this. As a struggling businessman creating new start-ups, he could not compete with what NGO's were paying for some of the best and brightest. And even worse, he said, "by the time the NGO's are done with them, there isn't an ounce of entrepreneur left."
--R. Todd Johnson, Friends of Ethiopia, on a downside of paying above-market wages. HT: Chris Blattman
Thursday, July 8, 2010
World Food Prize 2010
David Beckman (Bread for the World) and Jo Luck (Heifer International) are the recipients of this year's World Food Prize, largely in honor of the role that NGOs play in improving food security. Beckman's work to nearly double membership in Bread for the World advocate for US policy changes are credited with lifting "hundreds of millions of people" out of poverty and hunger. Centrally highlighted are the US government's increases in aid, particularly to Africa and for agricultural development. "While these positive strides have many causes, they would not have happened without Beckmann and Bread for the World leading millions of citizen advocates across the country to press for change, nor without Beckmann's personal commitment to founding and strengthening other organizations working in concert to improve the lives of the poor." Beckman is a minister and an economist.
Heifer International has been involved in getting livestock to poor families as an additional source of income and food production. Luck expanded membership in the organization 20 fold since 1992 and is credited with expanding HI's outreach to enable 12 million families to feed themselves. Part of the program involves recipient families passing on one of the livestock's offspring to another needy family so that more families can be reached and recipients become givers in turn.
Monday, June 7, 2010
Lit in review: Credit and Export Crops
Ashraf, Gine, and Karlan, "Finding Missing Markets (and a Disturbing Epilogue): Evidence from an Export Crop Adoption and Marketing Intervention in Kenya," Amer. J. Agr. Econ, Vol. 91, (4), 973-990, ungated.
A Kenyan NGO helped farmers move into export crops [French beans, baby corn, or passion fruit] and lowered their marketing costs. This increased adopter income by 32% ... until EU production requirements changed a year later adding $581 costs per farmer and shut them out of the market. Ouch. Methods: clustered randomized control trial to determine the difference adding agricultural credit to their package of extension and marketing services.
"Other similar interventions include the use of mobile phones to obtain real-time prices for fish in markets along the shore by boat owners returning with their catches (Jensen 2007) and an intervention in India to provide internet kiosks in small villages in order to better inform villagers of market opportunities (Upton and Fuller, 2005; Goyal, 2008)."
Adding agricultural credit makes a farmer 19% more likely to grow an export crop and more of their land is used for export crops; and increases production (kg) for baby corn, but not for French beans (all extra-marginal).
A Kenyan NGO helped farmers move into export crops [French beans, baby corn, or passion fruit] and lowered their marketing costs. This increased adopter income by 32% ... until EU production requirements changed a year later adding $581 costs per farmer and shut them out of the market. Ouch. Methods: clustered randomized control trial to determine the difference adding agricultural credit to their package of extension and marketing services.
"Other similar interventions include the use of mobile phones to obtain real-time prices for fish in markets along the shore by boat owners returning with their catches (Jensen 2007) and an intervention in India to provide internet kiosks in small villages in order to better inform villagers of market opportunities (Upton and Fuller, 2005; Goyal, 2008)."
Adding agricultural credit makes a farmer 19% more likely to grow an export crop and more of their land is used for export crops; and increases production (kg) for baby corn, but not for French beans (all extra-marginal).
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Economics Works in Haiti
That's the news flash from Bob Murphy (Hat tip: MR). Businesses respond to incentives, economies of scale work in currency trade, and private individuals find ways to make do in areas where governments don't work. The main idea is that Haitians do the best they can under the circumstances and many of his ideas would not work because the prerequisites (particularly in human capital) aren't there. Although he is loathe to give possible government measures any credit for possibly helping society, the lack of public goods -- provided neither by the private market nor by the government -- is a serious cause of the constraints in their constrained optimization.
Any service that was nominally supplied by the government — including electricity, water, and garbage removal — was basically nonexistent.That is, the market hadn't provided it either.
One of the most amusing moments (at least in my eyes) occurred when I was talking with an older engineer from Seattle. Now this was a very cool guy; when he asked if I had read the State Department warning about Haiti, after I said yes he shook my hand and said, "Congratulations, you didn't listen to your government."Brilliant example of responding to incentives:
it occurred to me that maybe the local government was simply nonexistent, as opposed to being merely ineffective. I asked a few people if the government collected tax revenues, and one engineer said something like, "Well I don't know the specific numbers, but they must, because you can see all the unfinished houses." Apparently the tax code was based on completed houses, and so the residents of Leogane would make sure their buildings were in a perpetual state of construction, legally speaking.
He discusses whether housing problems are caused by poverty, by insufficient regulations, by lack of human capital, or something else without coming to much of a conclusion (little surprise, whatever the answer is, it can't be insufficient regulation). He also discusses the difficulty of labor allocation in NGOs without proper incentive structures and forbidden mutually beneficial trade opportunities. (Pictured: Cathedral in Leogane)
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Against Poverty Porn
There's a Calvin and Hobbes comic with Calvin taking pictures of himself with combed hair, room tidy, and everything idyllic. He informs Hobbes this will be used as proof one day that he was a model child because pictures don't lie. But they do tell only the stories you choose to shoot:

So Duncan McNicholl decided to try his hand at photography. He told people to choose how they would dress for two pictures: "'wochena' (the Chichewa equivalent of 'dressed to kill') and another of him 'wosachena,' or 'dressed very poorly.'" The results are magnificent.
Here is a subsistence farmer
(Ahem, Watson, he does have a Name. He is a Person.)
Right. Bauleni Banda.The name won't mean anything to most readers while his occupation communicates additional information.
(It still dehumanizes him to only give an occupation, perpetuating thinking about individuals as masses and groups.)
Hat tip: Aid Watch
We’ve all seen it: the photo of a teary-eyed African child, dressed in rags, smothered in flies, with a look of desperation that the caption all too readily points out. ... I reacted very strongly to these kinds of photos when I returned from Africa in 2008. I compared these photos to my own memories of Malawian friends and felt lied to. How had these photos failed so spectacularly to capture the intelligence, the laughter, the resilience, and the capabilities of so many incredible people?The truth is that the development sector, just like any other business, needs revenue to survive. Too frequently, this quest for funding uses these kind of dehumanizing images to draw pity, charity, and eventually donations from a largely unsuspecting public. I found it outrageous that such an incomplete and often inaccurate story was being so widely perpetuated by the organizations on the ground – the very ones with the ability and the responsibility to communicate the realities of rural Africa accurately.This is not to say that people do not struggle, far from it, but the photos I was seeing only told part of the story. I thought that these images were robbing people of their dignity, and I felt that the rest of the story should be told as well.
Here is a subsistence farmer
(Ahem, Watson, he does have a Name. He is a Person.)
Right. Bauleni Banda.The name won't mean anything to most readers while his occupation communicates additional information.
(It still dehumanizes him to only give an occupation, perpetuating thinking about individuals as masses and groups.)
Hat tip: Aid Watch
Saturday, April 24, 2010
Lit in review: Effects of Activism
Harrison and Scorse, "Multinationals and Anti-Sweatshop Activism," AER (2010), Vol. 100, No. 1, 247-273, ungated.
Pro-market-eers claim that people can "vote with their dollars" to express their disapproval of corporate actions and encourage proper actions. How effective is consumer activism in actually changing corporate governance? Harrison and Scorse study the anti-sweatshop movement in the US aimed at Nike, Adidas, and Reebok during the 1990s in Indonesia. Two things happened: the Indonesian government, under some pressure from the US government, raised the minimum wage in real terms; and shops in the textile, footwear, and apparel industry also raised their average wages.
Identification is not based on actual firm ownership or contracts, but the probability of a workshop being targeted is estimated based on census, corporate information, and region. They find that activists were successful in increasing wages in targeted firms: the wage increase was 10-20 percent larger than in foreign-owned firms in other industries and 30 percent larger than other firms in their industry. The increase largely came from greater compliance with minimum wage laws. The employment effects were small - smaller firms left the industry while larger firms did not noticeably change the size of their workforce - but profits decreased significantly.
Among factors they say were decisive is an open political atmosphere and the teamwork between US and Indonesian NGOs. Activism increased both the probability that firms would be detected paying below minimum wage and the penalty for firms that were caught. This was more important for large firms, like the multinationals, for whom bad press meant more. The one downside is that some firms have moved to other countries with lower wages, so the net effect is complicated (negative for people in Indonesia who would have been employed, positive for people in other countries who are now employed, negative for people in other countries now employed under bad conditions). Some criticisms.
Pro-market-eers claim that people can "vote with their dollars" to express their disapproval of corporate actions and encourage proper actions. How effective is consumer activism in actually changing corporate governance? Harrison and Scorse study the anti-sweatshop movement in the US aimed at Nike, Adidas, and Reebok during the 1990s in Indonesia. Two things happened: the Indonesian government, under some pressure from the US government, raised the minimum wage in real terms; and shops in the textile, footwear, and apparel industry also raised their average wages.
Identification is not based on actual firm ownership or contracts, but the probability of a workshop being targeted is estimated based on census, corporate information, and region. They find that activists were successful in increasing wages in targeted firms: the wage increase was 10-20 percent larger than in foreign-owned firms in other industries and 30 percent larger than other firms in their industry. The increase largely came from greater compliance with minimum wage laws. The employment effects were small - smaller firms left the industry while larger firms did not noticeably change the size of their workforce - but profits decreased significantly.
Among factors they say were decisive is an open political atmosphere and the teamwork between US and Indonesian NGOs. Activism increased both the probability that firms would be detected paying below minimum wage and the penalty for firms that were caught. This was more important for large firms, like the multinationals, for whom bad press meant more. The one downside is that some firms have moved to other countries with lower wages, so the net effect is complicated (negative for people in Indonesia who would have been employed, positive for people in other countries who are now employed, negative for people in other countries now employed under bad conditions). Some criticisms.
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Five Second ... White Man's Burden
It is easy for people to misread Easterly's views. I'm not certain why, other than that people don't read him carefully. In White Man's Burden [the Click to Look Inside link on the picture doesn't work, so click the title here to look inside], he opens by introducing that there are two problems: one is the suffering of the poor, the other is the historic inability of the West to solve the problems. In particular, despite spending $2,300,000,000,000 on foreign aid over the last 50 years, that we are still unable to get twelve cent medicines to the people who need them most. His work focuses on the second problem.
He does not in the entire book argue that we should spend less trying to help the poor. He argues that we are trying to help in ways that are largely ineffective. "I ... keep trying, not to abandon aid to the poor, but to make sure it reaches them." "Western assistance ... can still play some role in alleviating the sufferings of the poor."
He does not argue that aid can never be effective. He argues that the way we have gone about it has often been ineffective and proposes some ways to help it be more effective. He cites Botswana as an example of aid "supporting reform and good government," though detailing how abysmally it has failed to do the same elsewhere; he cites pages and pages of World Bank, WHO, and IMF programs that were successful.
He does not claim that we should give up trying to help people. He pleads that we change the question from How can I use foreign aid to solve every problem in the world to "What can foreign aid do for poor people" and then do it. "Aid agencies cannot end world poverty, but they can do many useful things to meet the desparate needs of the poor and give them new opportunities."
He does not provide a blueprint for how to solve every problem with aid. He does suggest several dimensions where significant progress could be made by experimentation in making aid more effective. They include:
Accountability and Specialization "The utopian agenda has led to collective responsibility for multiple goals for each agency, one of the worst incentive systems invented since mankind started walking upright.... Have individual accountability for individual tasks. Let aid agencies sepcialize in the sectors and countries they are best at helping. Then hold aid agencies accountable for their results by having truly independent evaluation of their efforts." "Not overall sweeping evaluations of a whole nationwide development program, but specific and continuous evaluation of particular interventions."
Feedback and Meaningful Participation from Recipients. "The needs of the rich get met because the rich give feedback to political and economic Searchers, and they can hold the Searchers accountable for following through with specific actions. The needs of the poor don't get met because the poor have little money or political power with which to make their needs known and they cannot hold anyone accountable to meet those needs." The jargon is already there, but he takes down Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as one set of planners talking to another set of planners, often written by the recipient government at the dictation of the donors, sometimes even undermining democratic processes and selections. "Visibility gives more power to Searchers while invisibility shifts power to Planners. The problem with aid is that the poor are mostly invisible." "Participation should mean more buying and voting power in the hands of the poor in aid."
Fund Maintenance. "Aid donors should just bite the bullet and permanently fund road maintenance, textbooks, drugs for clinics, and other operating costs of development projects. Politically dysfunctional governments that don't do maintenance can concentrate on other things. ... The return on spending on instructional materials in education is up to fourteen times higher than the return on spending on physical facilities." p. 190
On Peacekeeping: "Peacekeeping could be good, but just who is willing to be accountable for its success or failure. ... Interventionism suffers from the patronizing assumption that only the West can keep the locals from killing eah other. ... Peace usually succeeds war because of a decisive victory by one side, not because of negotiated settlements by outsiders. ... UN interventions produced a stable peace only a quarter of the time. With no intervention, a stable peace resulted nearly half the time." He is overall quite negative on military interventionism.
One thing that I have admired about Easterly is that he is willing to admit that he was wrong. He does so at least twice in the book, once discussing market reform "shock therapy" and once in discussing structural adjustment. I asked him at his blog whether some of his own work fell under a criticism he had just made, and he admitted that one of the papers I mentioned fell into the same category. He promised a bit more of a response which I'm still waiting for, but there's something comforting in talking with someone you know is willing to say "I was wrong." In the book he opined that the military would be the least responsive to criticism, but on his blog has noted with surprise that the military responded the most cordially and promisingly of any group he has criticized.
One of my few criticisms is that he simultaneously calls for more observability while deriding current aid projects for overly focusing on observability without differentiating what should be observable. That is, he wants to trim down the number of goals any agency is responsible for, so it is more observable who does what, but he laments incentives that support building facilities or roads because they are more visible than textbooks or maintenance.
After presenting a fairly convincing case that Planning really doesn't work, I also noted with some irony that there was a heavy element of planning involved in the homegrown development cases he lauds at the end of the book. He acknowledges some of this, that "the success stories follow a variety of formulas," but prefers to call South Korea and Japan's actions intervening in economies rather than planning and to note that China and Singapore are "quite far from a laissez-faire model." "What we do know ... is that the West played small part in them." This leaves open a door for domestic planning to be good and foreign planning to be bad, a door I think he could do a much better job turning into a window or a peephole.
"Success attracts paternity claims." So every theory of development claims success for the various successes. When Sachs visited Cornell, for instance, he laughed at Easterly's assertion that aid hasn't done much and cited the total figure of aid given to China and India. Easterly notes that those large sums only amount to $0.001 per day for each Chinese person and $0.005 for each Indian person. Compare that to the much larger sums spent in Africa (which Sachs calls a mere $0.50 per person) and you wonder how so little could do so much while so much does so little.
Some very good 'side note' sections: The importance of social networks (p. 82-87), property rights (p. 90-99), the difficulties of making democracy work and its evolution (p. 116-129), comparing the cost effectiveness of health initiaives (HIV prevention, AIDS treatment, and others; p. 249-258). He also has some excellent snapshots of World Bank publications from the 1950s or 1980s to today, all saying the exact same thing: things are bad, but there are promising signs out there. I learned that it is much easier for me to be sanguine when reading about the colonial disasters of England, France, and Portugal than to read about the (usually CIA-backed) disasters the US sponsored (270-338).
Notable Quotables after the break:
He does not in the entire book argue that we should spend less trying to help the poor. He argues that we are trying to help in ways that are largely ineffective. "I ... keep trying, not to abandon aid to the poor, but to make sure it reaches them." "Western assistance ... can still play some role in alleviating the sufferings of the poor."He does not argue that aid can never be effective. He argues that the way we have gone about it has often been ineffective and proposes some ways to help it be more effective. He cites Botswana as an example of aid "supporting reform and good government," though detailing how abysmally it has failed to do the same elsewhere; he cites pages and pages of World Bank, WHO, and IMF programs that were successful.
He does not claim that we should give up trying to help people. He pleads that we change the question from How can I use foreign aid to solve every problem in the world to "What can foreign aid do for poor people" and then do it. "Aid agencies cannot end world poverty, but they can do many useful things to meet the desparate needs of the poor and give them new opportunities."
He does not provide a blueprint for how to solve every problem with aid. He does suggest several dimensions where significant progress could be made by experimentation in making aid more effective. They include:
Accountability and Specialization "The utopian agenda has led to collective responsibility for multiple goals for each agency, one of the worst incentive systems invented since mankind started walking upright.... Have individual accountability for individual tasks. Let aid agencies sepcialize in the sectors and countries they are best at helping. Then hold aid agencies accountable for their results by having truly independent evaluation of their efforts." "Not overall sweeping evaluations of a whole nationwide development program, but specific and continuous evaluation of particular interventions."
Feedback and Meaningful Participation from Recipients. "The needs of the rich get met because the rich give feedback to political and economic Searchers, and they can hold the Searchers accountable for following through with specific actions. The needs of the poor don't get met because the poor have little money or political power with which to make their needs known and they cannot hold anyone accountable to meet those needs." The jargon is already there, but he takes down Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as one set of planners talking to another set of planners, often written by the recipient government at the dictation of the donors, sometimes even undermining democratic processes and selections. "Visibility gives more power to Searchers while invisibility shifts power to Planners. The problem with aid is that the poor are mostly invisible." "Participation should mean more buying and voting power in the hands of the poor in aid."
Fund Maintenance. "Aid donors should just bite the bullet and permanently fund road maintenance, textbooks, drugs for clinics, and other operating costs of development projects. Politically dysfunctional governments that don't do maintenance can concentrate on other things. ... The return on spending on instructional materials in education is up to fourteen times higher than the return on spending on physical facilities." p. 190On Peacekeeping: "Peacekeeping could be good, but just who is willing to be accountable for its success or failure. ... Interventionism suffers from the patronizing assumption that only the West can keep the locals from killing eah other. ... Peace usually succeeds war because of a decisive victory by one side, not because of negotiated settlements by outsiders. ... UN interventions produced a stable peace only a quarter of the time. With no intervention, a stable peace resulted nearly half the time." He is overall quite negative on military interventionism.
One thing that I have admired about Easterly is that he is willing to admit that he was wrong. He does so at least twice in the book, once discussing market reform "shock therapy" and once in discussing structural adjustment. I asked him at his blog whether some of his own work fell under a criticism he had just made, and he admitted that one of the papers I mentioned fell into the same category. He promised a bit more of a response which I'm still waiting for, but there's something comforting in talking with someone you know is willing to say "I was wrong." In the book he opined that the military would be the least responsive to criticism, but on his blog has noted with surprise that the military responded the most cordially and promisingly of any group he has criticized.
One of my few criticisms is that he simultaneously calls for more observability while deriding current aid projects for overly focusing on observability without differentiating what should be observable. That is, he wants to trim down the number of goals any agency is responsible for, so it is more observable who does what, but he laments incentives that support building facilities or roads because they are more visible than textbooks or maintenance.
After presenting a fairly convincing case that Planning really doesn't work, I also noted with some irony that there was a heavy element of planning involved in the homegrown development cases he lauds at the end of the book. He acknowledges some of this, that "the success stories follow a variety of formulas," but prefers to call South Korea and Japan's actions intervening in economies rather than planning and to note that China and Singapore are "quite far from a laissez-faire model." "What we do know ... is that the West played small part in them." This leaves open a door for domestic planning to be good and foreign planning to be bad, a door I think he could do a much better job turning into a window or a peephole.
"Success attracts paternity claims." So every theory of development claims success for the various successes. When Sachs visited Cornell, for instance, he laughed at Easterly's assertion that aid hasn't done much and cited the total figure of aid given to China and India. Easterly notes that those large sums only amount to $0.001 per day for each Chinese person and $0.005 for each Indian person. Compare that to the much larger sums spent in Africa (which Sachs calls a mere $0.50 per person) and you wonder how so little could do so much while so much does so little.
Some very good 'side note' sections: The importance of social networks (p. 82-87), property rights (p. 90-99), the difficulties of making democracy work and its evolution (p. 116-129), comparing the cost effectiveness of health initiaives (HIV prevention, AIDS treatment, and others; p. 249-258). He also has some excellent snapshots of World Bank publications from the 1950s or 1980s to today, all saying the exact same thing: things are bad, but there are promising signs out there. I learned that it is much easier for me to be sanguine when reading about the colonial disasters of England, France, and Portugal than to read about the (usually CIA-backed) disasters the US sponsored (270-338).
Notable Quotables after the break:
Labels:
Africa,
Aid,
Books,
Conflict,
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Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Initial Successes: Zero Rupee Note
An Indian NGO named 5th Pillar prints and distributes zero (yes, 0) Rupee notes to the poor who then hand them to corrupt officials asking for bribes in order to get public services that ought to be free. Sounds nutty, right? According to the World Bank, it's doing something:Fed up with requests for bribes and equipped with a zero rupee note, the old lady handed the note to the official. He was stunned. Remarkably, the official stood up from his seat, offered her a chair, offered her tea and gave her the title she had been seeking for the last year and a half to obtain without success.... In another experience, a corrupt official in a district in Tamil Nadu was so frightened on seeing the zero rupee note that he returned all the bribe money he had collected for establishing a new electricity connection back to the no longer compliant citizen.
Granted there is no quantitative econometrics, survey, or experimental data, I'm just impressed there are qualitative instances (datum-s) of this being effective. How/Why does it work?
First, bribery is a crime in India punishable with jail time. Corrupt officials seldom encounter resistance by ordinary people that they become scared when people have the courage to show their zero rupee notes, effectively making a strong statement condemning bribery. ... More importantly, Anand believes that the success of the notes lies in the willingness of the people to use them. People are willing to stand up against the practice that has become so commonplace because they are no longer afraid: first, they have nothing to lose, and secondly, they know that this initiative is being backed up by an organization—that is, they are not alone in this fight.I have a feeling Gandhi would love it. Hat tip: Marginal Revolution
Labels:
Governance,
India,
NGO,
Success
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