Lit in review: 3 and 4 of 4 on the Insider/Outsider Model

3) Rueda (2005), "Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties," Am. Poli. Sci. Review, Vol. 99, No. 1, 61-74.

4) Coen (2007), "Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying," J. of Euro. Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 333-345

3) This paper combines insider/outsider labor models with political economy. He argues that social democratic parties (SDPs) are nominally pro-labor, but really are pro-insider, so that outsider (unemployed) are either unrepresented or are sometimes better represented by SDPs and sometimes by more conservative governments, depending on whether their interests align with labor-insiders or "upscale" elements. Specifically, outsiders and upscale groups want less employment protection and more policies to promote more widely available, cheaper labor; insiders and upscale groups want less active government participation in labor markets to reduce tax burdens. He uses survey data to demonstrate that outsiders (including students), insiders, and self-employed really do have different policy preferences from each other and that they align as his framework predicts.

Because of these insider/outsider dynamics, then, SPDs have become less interested in equality and security for the most vulnerable. Thus, parties and policy transform based on new voter demands. "Economic factors affect the preferences of particular electorates and, as a consequence, the strategies of partisan governments" (p. 72).

4) This paper introduces a volume of large N empirical studies on European interest groups. Coen has two other papers (97 and 98) mapping access to the EU policy process which could be useful. See also Bouwen (2002 and 2004a). A useful figure from CONECCS identifies the number of EU interest groups by policy area, with agriculture and rural development the 4th largest with 115 groups vying for attention. (the website listed in the paper no longer exists, but you may be able to get the most recent information here.) He describes how interest groups adapt from being national lobbyists to international and how groups gain insider status.

"We can no longer see Europeanization of interest politics in terms of 'bottom up' management of the EU, or 'top down' coordination, but as a managed multi-level process with numerous feedback loops and entry points constrained by the size of the interest group, lobbying budgets, and the nature of the policy area" (p. 337).